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THE BOTTOM LINE LIMITATION 
TO THE RULE OF GRIGGS V. DUKE 
POWER COMPANY 
James P. Scanlan* 
In Connecticut v. Teal1 the Supreme Court issued a ruling of 
major importance to the way the law defines employment dis-
crimination. By a five-to-four vote, the Court resisted an effort 
to curb the principle that for more than a decade had been the 
cornerstone of equal employment opportunity. In doing so, the 
Court, for the present, left apparently intact the protection Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 has been deemed to afford 
individuals injured by employment practices that more heavily 
burden one group than another. Yet, the narrowness of the mar-
gin by which the Court reached its decision, in conjunction with 
the Court's failure to resolve a significant related issue, raises a 
question about the future of that protection. 
Part I of this article analyzes the background to the Teal deci-
sion and the treatment by the majority and dissent of the issue 
known in employment discrimination law as the "bottom line" 
limitation to the disparate impact theory of employment dis-
crimination. Part II explains why, for reasons beyond those con-
sidered by the Teal majority, not only was the Court's rejection 
of the bottom line theory manifestly correct, but a contrary re-
sult would have had grievous consequences. Part III then argues 
for a similar rejection of the bottom line limitation in those situ-
ations where most observers have taken for granted that the bot- · 
tom line limitation would apply. 
* Attorney, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. A.B., 1966, 
John Carroll University; J.D., 1969, Harvard Law School. 
This article was written in the author's private capacity. No official support or en-
dorsement by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any other agency of 
the United States Government is intended or should be inferred. 
I. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
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I. THE Teal DECISION 
In its 1971 decision in Griggs u; Duke Power Co. 3 a unanimous 
Supreme Court held that even though an employer applies the 
same employment criteria to all racial groups and does so with-
out intending to discriminate on a proscribed basis, it is unlaw-
ful for the employer to use selection practices that dispropor-
tionately disadvantage racial groups unless the practice can be 
shown to have ((a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question."• Griggs involved a high school diploma requirement 
and the use of standardized tests. The Court found that both of 
these criteria disproportionately disqualified blacks from certain 
jobs and that neither of them was shown to be related to the 
performance of the jobs for which they were used. 
Courts subsequently applied the Griggs rule to a variety of 
practices that disparately affect minorities or women. These 
practices included nepotism policies, 5 refusals to hire persons 
with arrest6 or conviction records,7 discharges of persons whose 
wages have been garnished,8 as well as experience9 and height 
and weight requirements.10 Its most significant application, how-
ever, continues to involve unvalidated testing practices that dis-
advantage blacks or Hispanics.11 It is difficult to exaggerate the 
3. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
4. Id. at 432. Elsewhere in Griggs the Court described the required justification for 
such practices as "business necessity." Id. at 431. While there has been considerable dis-
cussion of the significance of various formulations of the employer's burden, see, e.g., 
Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419 
(1982); Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Stand-
ards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376 (1981), for present purposes, the phrase "job-relatedness" 
suffices. 
5. See Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984). 
6. See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). 
7. See Green v. Missouri P. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
8. See Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Pike Corp. 
of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
9. See Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
452 U.S. 940 (1981); Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981); Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Wis. 1975), 
aff'd, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976). 
10. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (women/height and weight); Craig 
v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981) 
(Hispanics/height only). 
11. The lower courts originally relied on Griggs to bolster an existing line of authority 
invalidating departmental seniority systems that perpetuated past discriminatory assign-
ment patterns. See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 307 (8th 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 
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rule's significance in ensuring that employers evaluate all indi-
viduals without regard to arbitrary criteria that, for an assort-
ment of reasons, more heavily burden minorities or women. 
In Teal the Court faced the question whether, under Griggs, 
an employer need demonstrate the job-relatedness of each ele-
ment of its selection process that has a disparate impact upon a 
certain group, if the overall ("bottom line") result of the entire 
process is the selection of members of that group at a rate equal 
to the group's representation in the relevant labor pool. The 
plaintiffs in Teal were black employees of the Department of 
Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut who were de-
nied promotion to the position of Welfare Eligibility Supervisor 
because they failed an examination shown to have an adverse 
impact on blacks. Notwithstanding the adverse impact of the 
test, however, blacks were selected at a high enough rate from 
among those who passed the test, evidently as a result of affirm-
ative action on the part of the State, that the overall selection 
rate of black candidates was higher than that of whites. Hence, 
the State argued, because the selection process did not have an 
adverse impact at the bottom line, it should not be required to 
prove the job-relatedness of the test. 
The district court agreed with this argument. 12 This decision 
accorded with other lower court authority that had also upheld 
the bottom line approach to Griggs.13 Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, rejecting the approach 
in the circumstances before it. 14 The court, however, explicitly 
limited its ruling to the situation where the discriminatory ele-
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). In Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324 (1977), however, while acknowledging the applicability of the Griggs rule to such 
situations, the Court held that Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h) (1982), 
insulated bona fide seniority systems from such an attack. In light of the Court's subse-
quent broad interpretations of what constitutes a bona fide seniority system in California 
Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980), and American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 
456 U.S. 63 (1982), Griggs is unlikely to be of further importance in this area. 
12. Teal v. Connecticut, No. B-79-128 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 1980), rev'd, 645 F.2d 133 
(2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). . 
13. Among those decisions deemed by the Teal dissent to have squarely considered 
the issue, and in each instance to have accepted the bottom line approach to Griggs, 
were: EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Navajo Ref. 
Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Rule 
v. Ironworkers Local 396, 568 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Williams v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 483 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd mem., 685 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979); Lee v. City of 
Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1978). See 457 U.S. at 460 n.5 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
14. Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
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ment in the selection process presents a pass-fail barrier that 
could disqualify a candidate from further consideration and sug-
gested that it would reach a different result where the element 
merely received a certain weight in a multi-component selection 
process. 111 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, two considera-
tions seemed to enhance the plaintiffs' position. First, as noted, 
Teal involved a pass-fail barrier that could absolutely preclude a 
candidate from further consideration. At a minimum, this pre-
cluded the defendant from portraying the situation as involving 
a complex aggregate of varied selection devices-some favoring 
whites and some favoring blacks, some job related and some 
not-where the complicated process of sorting out the impact of 
each device and determining its job-relatedness was unlikely to 
be worth the effort, if, indeed, it was possible at all. 16 Second, 
because the State's bottom line performance had clearly resulted 
from affirmative action in the form of preferential selections 
from among blacks who passed the test, those opposed to or un-
easy with affirmative action might . be inclined to support the 
plaintiffs' position.17 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision. 
Writing for the five-member majority,18 Justice Brennan consid-
15. Id. at 138-39. 
16. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, for instance, in its amicus 
curiae brief requesting the Court to reject the bottom line theory in Teal, indicated that 
it believed the bottom line limitation on Griggs should apply where the discriminatory 
element in the selection process was not a pass-fail barrier, but only an intermediate step 
in a multifaceted selection process. Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5. 
17. The AFL-CIO argued before the Court that the bottom line theory in Teal 
amounted to "the proposition that two wrongs make a right." Brief for the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at 6-7. 
18. Calling the decision "a long and unhappy step in the direction of confusion," 
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, primarily attacked 
the majority's holding as blurring the distinction between disparate impact and disparate 
treatment theories of employment discrimination. Arguing that plaintiffs "cannot have it 
both ways" by relying on group figures to prove discrimination at one point in the pro-
cess while not accepting group figures to prove nondiscrimination in the overall process, 
the strongly worded dissent found it unnecessary to analyze the bottom line theory in its 
alternative formulation as an affirmative defense, evidently believing it sufficiently clear 
that no prima facie case was established. 457 U.S. at 456-60. 
The dissent went on to dispute the majority's reliance on the Court's prior decisions. It 
argued that, of the cases on which the majority purported to find support, those involv-
ing disparate impact, New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405 (1975), had not treated the bottom line issue and those stressing Title VII's protec-
tion of individuals, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), 
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), and City of Los Angeles Dep't of 
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ered and rejected contentions (1) that the nondiscriminatory19 
bottom line result precluded plaintiffs from establishing a prima 
facie case, or, alternatively, (2) that this result provided an af-
firmative defense. 20 In treating the first contention, Brennan 
stressed Title VIl's focus on the opportunity to be selected for 
employment rather than the actual selection. He then rejected 
the affirmative defense as inconsistent with Title VII's protec-
tion of individuals. 
The Court commenced its analysis of the prima facie case21 by 
quoting section 703(a)(2) of Title VI122 and then discussed its 
holding in Griggs that, irrespective of the fact that a practice 
applies to blacks and whites alike, Title VII prohibits a practice 
that denies employment opportunities to a disproportionate 
number of blacks, unless it relates to job performance.23 In find-
ing that the practice in question fell within the language of the 
statute as interpreted in Griggs, the Court gave considerable em-
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), had involved disparate treatment. 457 
U.S. at 460-63. The dissent then briefly addressed the policy implications of the decision, 
observing that the expense of ensuring the job-relatedness of selection procedures might 
well lead to "the adoption of simple quota hiring." That result, it reasoned, was unfair to 
individuals, was unlikely to lead to a competent work force, and might ultimately result 
in the employment of fewer minorities. Id. at 463-64. 
The dissent did not even mention that the favorable overall black selection rate had 
resulted from affirmative action. Indeed, as just noted, it observed that the result 
reached by the majority itself might lead to quota hiring. As to the pass-fail character of 
the test at issue, although the dissent had caustically disparaged the majority's reasoning 
throughout, it did note that it understood this reasoning to permit the application of the 
bottom line limitation where the test constituted only one factor in a multi-component 
selection process rather than a pass-fail barrier, id. at 463 n.8; presumably the dissent 
agreed with this result. 
19. This article will use nondiscriminatory, the word that the Teal majority used to 
describe the bottom line result relied upon by the employer, e.g., 457 U.S. at 447 n.7, 
454. For reasons stated throughout the article, however, the word has its shortcomings. 
20. Id. at 447 n.7. 
In Part 11.B. of the opinion, id. at 451-52, the Court also treated, and rejected, an 
argument of the amicus curiae United States Department of Justice that section 703(h) 
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982), precluded plaintiffs from challenging a pro-
fessionally developed examination where the bottom line result of the selection process 
was nondiscriminatory. 
21. 457 U.S. at 445-51. 
22. Section 703(a)(2) states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). 
23. 457 U.S. at 445-49. 
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phasis to the word "opportunities." It noted in particular that 
"[t]he statute speaks, not in terms of jobs and promotions, but 
in terms of limitations and classifications that would deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities."2• In a footnote, 211 
the Court underlined its distinction between the opportunity to 
be selected and the actual selections themselves by distinguish-
ing section 703(a)(2) from section 703(a)(l). The latter section 
makes it an unlawful employment practice "to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual,"26 but does not refer to em-
ployment opportunities generally. The Court reasoned that al-
though section 703(a)(l) might only apply to actual selections, 
703(a)(2) prevents employers from discriminating as to employ-
ment opportunities. 
The Court went on to stress the word "opportunity(ies)" sev-
eral more times in finding that the practice at issue presented 
precisely the type of "barrier" to equal employment opportunity 
that concerned the Court in Griggs. 27 It found support for this 
focus in the legislative history to the 1972 amendments of Title 
VIl,28 which extended its coverage to state and municipal em-
ployers, and in its own prior decisions.29 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case, ob-
serving that "[t]he suggestion that disparate impact should be 
measured only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII 
guarantees these individual respondents the opportunity to 
compete equally with white workers on the basis of job-related 
criteria. "30 
In Part III of the opinion,31 the Court rejected the argument, 
advanced by the State and certain amici curiae, that it should 
accept nondiscriminatory bottom line performance as an affirm-
ative defense, terming the argument "in essence nothing more 
than a request that we redefine the protections guaranteed by 
Title VIl."32 In treating this point, the Court shifted its empha-
24. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original). 
25. Id. at 448 n.9. 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). 
27. 457 U.S. at 448-51. 
28. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13. 
29. The Court cited New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) 
(upholding a refusal to hire persons using methadone against allegation that it had a 
disparate impact upon blacks); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding 
height and weight requirements that disparately affected women unlawful); and Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (holding tests that disparately affected 
blacks unlawful). 457 U.S. at 450. 
30. 457 U.S. at 451 (emphasis in the original). 
31. Id. at 452-56. 
32. Id. at 453. 
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sis slightly to the word "individual" in Title VII's proscription of 
employment discrimination. It observed that, in arguing that 
bottom line performance might be a defense to a disparate im-
pact claim, the State and its supporting amici curiae "appear to 
confuse unlawful discrimination with discriminatory intent."33 
An employer's overall performance, the Court noted, has rele-
vance only to the question of intent-a question not at issue in a 
disparate impact case. 3' The Court went on to emphasize that 
its prior decisions 311 had found that "the 'statute's focus on the 
individual is unambiguous.' "36 The Court rejected efforts to dis-
tinguish these cases on the grounds that they involved racially 
discriminatory policies, concluding that "irrespective of the form 
taken by the discriminatory practice, an employer's treatment of 
other members of the plaintiffs' group can be 'of little comfort to 
the victims of . . . discrimination.' "37 
In reaching its decision, the Court apparently gave no weight 
to the fact that the favorable overall black selection rate re-
sulted from affirmative action. 38 While pointing out that the 
Second Circuit had characterized the final aspect of the selection 
process as an affirmative action program, the Court noted that 
the State contested that characterization and that it was unnec-
essary to resolve the dispute in the case before it. 39 As to the 
nature of the discriminatory element in the selection process, al-
though the Court did quote the Second Circuit to the effect that 
the pass-fail barrier at issue precluded those who failed the test 
33. Id. at 454. 
34. Id. 
35. The cases cited by the Court (and their relevant holdings) are: Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (holding refusal to hire mothers of pre-
school age children unlawful notwithstanding that 70-75% of applicants and 75-80% of 
the hires for the position in question were women); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567 (1978) (holding balanced work force not a defense to purposeful discrimination 
against an individual); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702 (1978) (holding requirement of larger contributions to pension fund from female em-
ployees unlawful notwithstanding that women lived longer as a group); and Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (holding employer's subsequent hiring of minorities 
not a defense to earlier post-Act unlawful discrimination). 437 U.S. at 454-55. 
36. 457 U.S. at 455 (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978)). 
37. 457 U.S. at 455 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 (1977)). 
38. Nevertheless, the Court did state: "It is clear that Congress never intended to 
give an employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or 
sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the employees' group." 457 U.S. 
at 455. Whether or not the Court intended "favorably treats" to connote affirmative ac-
tion, it seems not to have been imparting particular significance to the matter of the 
means by which the employer reached a nondiscriminatory bottom line result. 
39. Id. at 444 & n.5. 
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from further consideration;'0 the Court did not state whether it 
considered the nature of the barrier to be a relevant factor. 
II. Wuy Teal Was Correctly Decided 
In concluding a strongly worded dissent,41 Justice Powell ob-
served that a potential ramification of the majority's rejection of 
the bottom line theory was that the expense of ensuring the job-
relatedness of selection procedures would lead to "the adoption 
of simple quota hiring.""2 In fact, it is the bottom line approach 
to Griggs that subordinates a person's right to be considered on 
the basis of individual merit to a quota system that, for the pur-
pose of compliance with the nation's employment discrimination 
laws, deems fungible all persons designated as members of the 
same minority group. Regardless of the wisdom or propriety of 
remedial quotas directed at ameliorating the effects of past dis-
crimination, in the bottom line context there exist some very 
strong reasons-most of which Teal failed to discuss-for ob-
jecting to this subordination of individual to group rights. This 
part of the article appraises the correctness of the Teal decision 
in the context of the pass-fail barrier that was before the Court. 
Part III then discusses the bottom line issue where the discrimi-
natory element in the selection process is but one of a number of 
weighted factors. The first section of this Part argues that the 
Teal majority correctly analyzed the statutory language that 
constituted its principal focus in deciding the case. The second 
considers the policy considerations largely ignored by the Teal 
majority that, fully explored, add substantial support for the 
Court's decision. 
A. Language and Logic 
Because little doubt exists that the State achieved its accept-
able overall selection rate through affirmative action measures 
on the part of the employer,43 it remains debatable whether one 
40. "[W]here 'an identifiable pass-fail barrier denies an employment opportunity to a 
disproportionately large number of minorities and prevents them from proceeding to the 
next step in the selection process,' that barrier must be shown to be job related." Id. at 
445 (quoting Teal v. Connecticut, 648 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
41. See supra note 18. 
42. 457 U.S. at 463-64 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
43. The State did not make a colorable argument before the Court that affirmative 
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should regard Teal as actually presenting a situation where an 
element in a selection process disqualified a disproportionate 
number of individuals from a certain racia1'14 group but the pro-
cess as a whole did not disproportionately exclude the group. 
Rather, it might be argued, the "selection process"-the phrase 
commonly understood to mean the evaluative process that pur-
ports to determine the candidates' relative abilities to perform a 
particular job-did have an adverse impact upon blacks as a 
group. One can view the subsequent affirmative action as an ar-
tificial measure taken to correct the impact upon the group 
though not to remedy the harm to each individual affected by 
the policy. 
For present purposes, however, we may leave aside whether 
this consideration ought itself to decide the issue in favor of the 
Teal plaintiffs. Assuming that the Teal case did actually raise 
the question whether harm to the individual or harm to the 
group represents the critical inquiry under Title VII and Griggs, 
the majority reached the correct result. In its analysis of the 
prima facie case,45 however, the Court apparently deemed it 
necessary to find a disparate impact upon blacks as a group at 
the point in the process where blacks were disproportionately 
excluded from the pool of persons eligible for further considera-
tion. This approach, while supportive of the appropriate result 
in Teal, constituted an unnecessarily subtle way of arriving at 
that result, one which may prove unsatisfactory in other 
circumstances. 
The Court's focus on Title VII's guarantee of equal treatment 
of the individual,46 expressed only in rejecting nondiscriminatory 
bottom line performance as an affirmative defense; more accu-
rately captured the wisdom of Griggs's interpretation of the 
statute. Although many may have thought that Griggs involves a 
concept of group rights because its application in a particular 
factual situation necessarily entails statistical inquiry into the 
way a practice affects a group,47 the protection of individual 
action had not caused the favorable overall black selection rate. See Brief of Petitioners 
at 4 n.l; Brief of Respondents at 5, 22-23; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3-4. 
44. For ease of reference, I will usually discuss the issues in terms of racial impact. 
Unless otherwise indicated, these statements pertain to disparate impacts upon gender 
and ethnic groups as well. 
45. 457 U.S. at 445-51. 
46. Id. at 452-56. 
47. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Con-
cept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Brilmayer, Hekeler, 
Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Le-
gal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 508-11 (1980); Jain & Ledvinka, 
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rights remains Griggs's primary focus. The Griggs rule simply 
embodies the common sense proposition that to discriminate 
against an individual on the basis of a characteristic he is more 
likely to have because of his race is to discriminate against the 
individual on the basis of his race. 48 This characterization is not 
merely convenient phrasing to lend appeal to a certain way of 
looking at the bottom line issue. It also makes a difference in 
contexts beyond the bottom line issue.49 
Economic Inequality and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 26 LAB. L.J. 579 
(1975). 
48. Even if a reading of Griggs as primarily guaranteeing group rights had more sup-
port than it does, the explicitness of Title VII's focus upon the individual in its proscrip-
tion of discrimination because of race, § 703(a)(l), (2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(l), (2) (1982) (quoted in relevant part supra note 22 and text accompanying notes 
18-26), dictates a reading of the Griggs rule as protecting individuals from discrimination 
on the basis of race-related characteristics. Such an interpretation finds ample support in 
Title VII's legislative history, the language of Griggs itself, and the Court's post-Griggs 
interpretations of the statute-all of which stress that Title VIl's role as a nondiscrimi-
nation statute is based on the principle of fairness to the individual. See Comment, The 
Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 911 (1979); see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 452-55 (discussing the statute's focus on the 
individual); see also id. at 454-55 (discussing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567 (1978), a case not mentioned in the Comment). To be sure, concern about the status 
of blacks as a group played an important role in prompting Congress's enactment of 
Title VII. The Supreme Court relied on indications of this concern to hold in United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), that Title VII did not prohibit voluntary 
race-conscious affirmative action efforts. These expressions of concern, however, in no 
way conflict with the view that guaranteeing individual fairness represents the mecha-
nism for addressing the problem. Cf. Comment, supra, at 932 n.109. Moreover, even if 
Congress indicated a belief that this guarantee would prove inadequate, this would 
hardly suggest that courts should overlook the guarantee of the rights of blacks as indi-
viduals. In any case, the legislative history as a whole makes clear that Congress believed 
the guarantee of fair treatment of individuals would at least be Title VII's primary 
means of elevating the economic status of blacks and other groups that had previously 
been denied fair treatment. See id. at 926-28; see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 454. After all, 
this approach seems to reflect what a reasonable person would presume a ban on dis-
crimination means. 
49. See Comment, supra note 48. The Comment, relying on theories expressed in 
Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 299-304 (1971), argues 
for an interpretation of Griggs as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of characteris-
tics that are the "functional equivalents" of race, an interpretation similar to that ex-
pressed here. The Comment contrasts this fairness concept of "equal treatment" for in-
dividual members of the group with a social policy concept of "equal achievement" for 
the group, and argues that, while the equal achievement/social policy concept might jus-
tify a virtually limitless standard of business necessity, the functional equivalence/equal 
treatment/fairness concept would entail a business necessity standard considerably more 
lenient than that typically imposed by the courts. The Comment bases this argument on 
the fact that an element of the functional equivalence/equal treatment/fairness concept, 
as originally formulated in Fiss, supra, at 301-02, is that the criterion at issue serves no 
legitimate business purpose. See Comment, supra note 48, at 924-25. 
Yet, it does not necessarily follow that to disadvantage a person on the basis of a race-
related characteristic is any less unfair because the employer derives some benefit from 
the practice. Indeed, even when the employer's reasons for a policy satisfy the most 
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Watkins v. United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 
2369,5° a case decided early in the post-Griggs development of 
the disparate impact theory, demonstrates this difference. Wat-
kins involved a challenge to a "last-hired/first-fired" provision of 
a negotiated seniority system. The employer had had a long his-
tory of racial discrimination in hiring but for over ten years had 
hired blacks on an equal basis with whites. Consequently, when 
it implemented a major layoff on the basis of the seniority sys-
tem, the layoff fell far more heavily on the employer's black 
work force than its white work force. Plaintiffs argued that the 
implementation of the layoff constituted a neutral practice that 
disproportionately disadvantaged blacks and, under Griggs, vio-
lated Title VII unless justified by business necessity. 
The Fifth Circuit, on appeal of a district court ruling for 
plaintiffs,51 reversed, refusing to apply Griggs to such a situa-
tion. It distinguished Griggs by noting that in that case, 
"[w]ithout business necessity, black applicants, otherwise equal 
with white applicants in ability to perform the job, were more 
likely to be eliminated from employment by [the high school di-
ploma requirement, an] irrelevant criteri[on]."52 In Watkins, 
however, each plaintiff was "treated equally with white persons 
who have places equal to his in the [employment] hierarchy. No 
individual black employee is, because of his race, more likely 
than his white counterpart to be affected by the applicable crite-
ria, seniority. "53 
The last sentence provides the key to the court's analysis. If a 
person disadvantaged by a neutral policy can show that his race 
made it more likely that he would be affected, Griggs applies; if 
he was not more likely to be affected by the policy because of his 
race, Griggs does not apply. Layoffs disproportionately disad-
vantaged blacks as a group; nevertheless, no black was treated 
unfairly, since no black affected by the policy was more likely to 
be affected because of anything to do with his race. 54 
stringent business necessity test, it would seem still to be unfair_ that the policy disad-
vantages individuals because of a race-related characteristic, although the law permits 
the unfairness. Nor is it clear that society should be willing to impose (bear) a greater 
economic cost to raise the economic status of a disadvantaged group rather than to en-
sure fairness to individual members of the group, particularly when ensuring that fair-
ness at the same time raises the economic status of the group. The cost society is willing 
to bear to guarantee the rights of a criminal defendant, for example, suggests that society 
places a considerable premium on individual fairness. 
50. 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). 
51. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). 
52. 516 F.2d at 45. 
53. Id. 
54. Although the Watkins court read Griggs correctly, it does not necessarily follow 
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Costa v. Markey/'r, the first appellate case to explore the im-
plications of Teal, also illustrates that the issue of whether 
Griggs is deemed to protect groups or individuals who possess 
characteristics of the group goes beyond the bottom line issue: 
Costa presented a situation where a local police department had 
to hire a woman police officer to perform duties that only a wo-
man could perform. In making the selection for the position the 
department imposed a 5'6" height requirement which, plaintiff 
asserted, had an unlawful disparate impact on women. 
Originally deciding the case while Teal was pending before the 
Supreme Court, the First Circuit held that Griggs did not ap-
ply. r,6 At that time the majority found the case to involve essen-
tially the same issue as the Teal case, but specifically rejected 
the Second Circuit's approach.57 After the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Second Circuit's decision in Teal, the First Circuit 
granted rehearing in Costa and ruled for the plaintiff.58 Al-
though recognizing arguable distinctions between Teal and the 
case before it where only women could be hired/'0 the court nev-
ertheless reversed itself, finding that Teal required that "[t]he 
Court's focus must be on the first step in the employment pro-
cess that produces an adverse impact on a group protected by 
Title VII, pot the end result of the· employment process as a 
whole."60 
In his dissent Judge Coffin relied on the distinctions between 
Costa and Teal. Apologizing for having, as author of the first 
panel opinion, originally equated the case with Teal, he stated 
that he now believed that the cases were significantly different, 
and that the Supreme Court's affirmance of Teal ought not af-
fect the result in Costa. Judge Coffin pointed out that; unlike 
Teal, where the employer made up for a disparate impact at one 
point in the selection process by action at another point in that 
process, in Costa, because of the initial determination to hire 
only women, men and women did not compete at any point in 
that the statute itself compelled its holding. Out of its concern for the status of blacks as 
a group, Congress could also have intended that employers justify practices if they have 
a group impact, even though they do not involve race-related unfairness to individuals. 
See supra note 48. 
55. 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir.), rev'd on reh'g, 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on reh'g, 
706 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). 
56. Id. at 160-61. 
57. Id. at 161-62. 
58. 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on reh'g, 706 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). 
59. Id. at 5. 
60. Id. at 4-5. 
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the selection process; hence, the height requirement never had a 
disparate impact on women.61 Ultimately that view prevailed. 
The First Circuit granted rehearing en bane and, in an opinion 
authored by Judge Coflin,62 found for the defendant on the 
grounds that "the height requirement cannot be viewed as hav-
ing a disparate effect on women. In the absence of a discrimina-
tory effect Teal simply does not apply."63 
Judge Coffin's point had merit in removing Costa from the 
controlling principle of the majority's prima facie analysis in 
Teal. To the extent that this analysis looked for a group impact 
at some point in the process, it should not control in Costa 
where the height requirement at no step excluded a dispropor-
tionate number of women (compared with men) from further 
consideration. Nevertheless, the height requirement plainly ex-
cluded women from consideration because of a sex-related char-
acteristic. From this perspective, the practice in Costa clearly in-
volved sex discrimination, just as the practice in Teal involved 
race discrimination. 64 Thus, for the same reason Teal was rightly 
61. Id. at 8-10. 
62. 706 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). 
63. Id. at 12. 
64. In the en bane opinion, the First Circuit also discussed a challenge to its earlier 
reliance, see 677 F.2d at 160, on a line of cases, including Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 
544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977), which held that the disparate 
impact theory could not apply where the sexes did not compete. The court correctly 
rejected arguments that Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983), and County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 
U.S. 161 (1981), cast doubt on that line of cases. 706 F.2d at 12. Nevertheless, Stroud 
really had nothing to do with the issue in Costa. Stroud involved a challenge to a no-
marriage rule for a job classification that was entirely female. The plaintiff claimed only 
that application of the rule to that classification, but not to other classifications that had 
lower female proportions of employees, had an unlawful disparate impact. (The argu-
ment, whatever its merit, would have applied as well if the classification to which the 
rule was applied were merely disproportionately female, relative to classifications to 
which the rule was not applied.) The plaintiff did not, however, claim that women were 
more likely to be married than men. Thus, as in Watkins, the employer denied no person 
an opportunity for a reason in any way linked to his or her race or sex. 
In James v. Delta Air Lines, 571 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978), 
the court did rely on Stroud to reject a claim that a mandatory maternity leave rule 
imposed upon an all-female job classification was unlawful sex discrimination. Still, even 
if one considers discrimination against pregnant employees amenable only to a disparate 
impacf analysis, and not to a disparate treatment analysis as well, see Wright v. Olin 
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), Stroud did not dictate the James result nor, it 
would seem, was that result correct. For in James, unlike Stroud, the policy disadvan-
taged persons by a characteristic related to their sex. 
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), presents the more troubling authority 
for the Costa issue. In Farah, the Court held, in a context where Hispanics comprised 
96% of the employer's work force at the subject (San Antonio, Texas) facility, that a 
refusal to hire noncitizens did not constitute national origin discrimination, although the 
policy clearly disproportionately disadvantaged persons of Hispanic origin. In so ruling 
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decided, Costa, it is submitted, was wrongly decided; in either 
case, whether or not the practice at issue ultimately harmed the 
group, it harmed individuals for reasons associated with their 
race or sex. 
B. Policy 
As the Teal dissent observed,611 the development of job-related 
selection procedures can be an expensive undertaking. Expen-
sive as well is the litigation of questions of impact and job-relat-
edness not only for the litigants but also for a legal system so 
burdened by employment discrimination litigation over the last 
decade. In fact, this represents the primary reason that, notwith-
standing the quota aspect of the bottom line issue as it arose in 
Teal, the bottom line limitation on Griggs received widespread 
support from employer groups66 and even from a Department of 
Justice that was at the same time decidedly moving away from 
quotas. 67 After an expensive and in many respects unsatisfactory 
decade of a meticulous approach to remedying the plight of 
blacks in America, many felt that if, at lower cost, acceptable 
treatment of the group as group could be achieved, the individu-
als could safely be left to take care of themselves. 
This view, however, presents two major problems. First, most 
of the advantages thought to be associated with the bottom line 
the Court noted "there is no indication in the record that Farah's policy against employ-
ment of aliens had the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of Mexican na-
tional origin." Id. at 93. Although one could read this remark to mean that there can be 
no disparate impact claim in the absence of competition among groups, one could also 
read it to mean simply that the plaintiff did not pursue such a disparate impact theory. 
If the former reading of Farah is correct and has not been implicitly overruled by Teal, 
it is submitted that, for reasons expressed generally herein, see infra section II.B.2, it 
should be explicitly overruled. 
65. 457 U.S. at 463 (Powell, J., dissenting). See supra note 18. 
66. At least one court has noted that employers may prefer the use of quotas to actu-
ally ensuring that their practices conform to the requirements of the law and noted the 
reasons for that preference. United States v. Virginia Dep't of Highways & Transp., 554 
F. Supp. 268, 270 & n.3 (E.D. Va. 1983); see also Seligman, Affirmative Action is Here to 
Stay, FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 1982, at 143, 162. 
67. Misgivings within the Reagan administration about the appropriateness of affirm-
ative action remedies that had been staples of government enforcement policy for more 
than a decade appeared as early as January 1981. See Transition Team Calls for Cut-
backs in Affirmative Action; Year-Long Freeze on EEOC Lawsuits, Guidelines, Daily 
Lab. Rep., Jan. 23, 1981, at 1, 7-9. The Government's definitive change of position first 
manifested itself in January 1983 when the Justice Department sought to intervene to 
challenge a ruling upholding quota remedies for the New Orleans Police Department in 
Williams v. City of New Orleans, 694 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1982). See United States v. 
Virginia Dep't of Highways & Transp., 558 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Va. 1983). 
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approach to Griggs do not exist at all; in fact, that approach 
may well be the more costly method of achieving even the puta-
tively acceptable treatment of the group. Second, difficulties 
with the assumption of the essential fungibility of members of a 
minority group that underlies the bottom line theory raise a se-
rious question whether the group treatment it contemplates can 
begin to fairly or effectively address the problems of disadvan-
taged groups or their members. 
1. Illusory advantages of the bottom line-
a. Res judicata and collateral estoppel effects-Without the 
bottom line defense to a disparate impact claim, an employer 
sued on such a claim receives a determination of the impact and 
job-relatedness of its procedures in as timely a fashion as an 
overburdened judicial system can provide it. Such determina-
tions generally would resolve the matter even as to persons not 
before the court.68 Thus, whether successful or unsuccessful in 
defending its procedures, the employer has received useful guid-
ance about how it may lawfully proceed in the future. 
If, however, the Court upheld the bottom line approach to 
Griggs, any ruling that permits an employer to use a selection 
device-because for the time period at issue it has performed 
satisfactorily at the bottom line-will not have a conclusive ef-
fect. Because a ruling on an employer's bottom line performance 
for one time period could have no res judicata or collateral es-
toppel effect for other time periods, persons adversely affected 
by the selection practice could challenge it each time it is used.69 
68. When a court decides the issue of a practice's job-relatedness against the em-
ployer, it will as a rule enjoin the future use of the practice. When it decides in an 
employer's favor, there is as a practical matter little chance that an adversely affected 
individual will raise the issue again in a subsequent action. Potential Title VII litigants 
encounter significant difficulty in obtaining counsel. See Petete v. Consol. Freightways, 
313 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Tex. 1970). An adverse decision on a job-relatedness issue ren-
dered by a district court would probably make it impossible for an individual to retain 
counsel to relitigate the question. Courts that have deemed even EEOC findings of no 
reasonable cause highly probative in determining whether to appoint counsel, e.g., Cas-
ton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977); McIntyre v. Michelin 
Tire Corp., 464 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (D.S.C. 1978), are unlikely to appoint counsel in the 
face of an adverse court judgment. Moreover, section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(k) (1982), provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a 
Title VII action. Although such awards are available to defendants only when the suit is 
"frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless," Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 
412, 422 (1977), the relitigation of an issue already decided by a district court in another 
proceeding might well be held to satisfy that standard. 
69. The likelihood of subsequent litigation (and attendant uncertainty for all who 
might be affected thereby) may be substantial if in the first attempt to challenge a prac-
tice evidence as to the lack of job-relatedness of the practice has been developed in the 
EEOC investigation, during discovery, or in court. Moveover, while the job-relatedness 
issue would not have to be reached in court, it might well be reached anyway (for exam-
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Each challenge would require at least an examination of the em-
ployer's bottom line performance, until the challenge involves a 
time period when the employer's bottom line performance falls 
short of that deemed acceptable. At that point a court would 
have to determine the impact and job-relatedness of the device. 
Such a situation does not serve judicial economy, the employer's 
interest in being able to rely on the legality of its practices, or 
the interest of employees in being able to make career choices 
knowing that litigation will not subsequently alter their places in 
the employment hierarchy. 
b. Time period measured- The reference in the preceding 
paragraph to "the time period for which that [bottom line] per-
formance is measured" raises an exceedingly difficult technical 
issue that may defy satisfactory resolution. Courts clearly must 
measure an employer's bottom line performance over some time 
frame-or, to state the same problem in different words, with 
regard to a defined set of employment decisions-just as in cases 
not involving the bottom line issue. There exists, however, no 
logical restriction upon how a plaintiff may focus upon a time 
period for demonstrating that, even if the employer discrimi-
nated at no other time, it did discriminate in the subject time 
period. Thus, a plaintiff could challenge the use of a discrimina-
tory device for any group of selections for which the defendant 
failed to achieve a nondiscriminatory selection rate. 70 Indeed, 
ple, when during a full trial it is asserted as an alternative defense). If decided against 
the employer, the persons adversely affected by the practice may likely launch a renewed 
attack when they believe the employer's bottom line performance is unsatisfactory. 
70. Issues of statistical significance ought not to present obstacles to an individual's 
challenging the use of a device for a small number of selections. Reference to a larger 
time period than that which the plaintiff puts at issue can usually show that the device 
has a disparate impact, because the tendency of a device to disadvantage certain groups 
will ordinarily vary little over even substantial periods of time. Moreover, even during 
the time period at issue, while there may be few selections, the employer may have ad-
ministered the selection device to a great many candidates. In Teal 307 persons were 
tested in a selection process which produced 46 promotions. 457 U.S. at 444. Of course, 
with some criteria, such as height or weight requirements, it may be unnecessary even to 
examine the impact of the device on actual applicants. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977). 
The absence of statistical significance in the selection rates also should not pose a 
problem. Because one would expect the overall result of the selection process to reflect 
the adverse impact of a device used in that process, the court does not need a statisti-
cally significant bottom line disparity to infer that the entire process has a tendency to 
discriminate. For example, if 100 whites and 100 blacks take a pass-fail exam, 70 whites 
and only 30 blacks pass, and 7 whites and 3 blacks (or even 6 whites and 4 blacks) are 
selected, it is clearly more reasonable to assume that the selection disparity, even if not 
statistically significant, results from the discriminatory element in the selection process 
rather than from chance. This connection between the impact of the device and the over-
all selection rates will be even clearer when the system actually ranks candidates. Where 
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even when the employer makes only one selection, problems may 
arise. An individual could challenge a device that had a dispa-
rate impact on his group if the employer selected a person from 
another group. Of course, permitting such challenges would com-
pletely undermine the utility of the bottom line approach to 
Griggs. 
Yet, even if courts do not permit the plaintiff to define the 
time period for measuring the employer's bottom line perform-
ance, they have no basis for establishing a time period in a man-
ner that will satisfactorily serve the purpose of the statute as 
informed by the legitimate ends of the bottom line theory. Only 
one principled restriction exists: under no circumstances should 
courts consider employment decisions made subsequent to the 
employer's notification of the EEOC charge.71 Without this re-
striction, employers could with impunity use whatever unvali-
dated neutral practices they liked, while making up for any dis-
criminatory impact by affirmative action selections only in those 
cases where a practice is actually challenged. Under such cir-
cumstances, most of these employers' neutral selection proce-
dures would not, in the long run, perform nondiscriminatorily at 
the bottom line. 72 
the rankings significantly correlate with the adverse impact of the device (or with race 
itselO, the absence of statistically significant disparity between the actual and expected 
selections of a group for a small number of selections based on those rankings has no 
relevance. 
The situation may be different where the employer's bottom line performance tends 
ordinarily to be nondiscriminatory because the group disadvantaged by the challenged 
practice performs better than other groups on other elements in the selection process. In 
such cases, evidence of the results of the selection process during other time periods 
might demonstrate that the entire selection process does not really tend to discriminate 
against the group disadvantaged by the challenged element; rather, the observed dispar-
ity for the period the plaintiff puts at issue may really result from chance. In the usual 
case, however, where the nondiscriminatory bottom line selection rate is due not to the 
group's superior performance on other elements in the selection process, but to affirma-
tive action decisions of the employer, the selection rates during other time periods are 
irrelevant. What the employer chooses to do during other time frames does nothing to 
undermine the assumption that the observed disparity during the period the plaintiff 
puts at issue more likely results naturally from the discriminatory element in the selec-
tion process than from chance. 
71. Reference to the EEOC charge is for the sake of simplicity. Actually there are 
certain other occasions, including, for example, notification of a charge with a state or 
local agency or the suit itself, see infra note 73, that might constitute an employer's first 
notification that the device in question is being seriously challenged. The key is that the 
challenge appears to the employer to be serious. Thus, whatever may be said for the 
significance of other events may be said more strongly for the filing of a suit. 
72. In cases not involving the bottom line, courts have usually refused to permit the 
employer to rely on decisions subsequent to the filing of the charge to detract from the 
plaintiff's pre-charge case. E.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 346 (10th 
Cir. 1975); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970); 
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Beyond this single rule, courts could develop only arbitrary 
criteria for defining time periods for measuring bottom line per-
formance. Even the arbitrary rules, however, would probably 
produce unsatisfactory results. Whatever criterion might be used 
for establishing the date commencing the time period, the plain-
tiff's discretion as to when to file his charge73 would dictate the 
date ending the period, thus placing the employer that wishes to 
rely on its nondiscriminatory bottom line performance at a con-
siderable disadvantage. At best, it would seem, the employer 
might avoid vulnerability by maintaining a rigid quota system, 
greatly impairing its flexibility in making selections at any point 
in time. Although this analysis only touches upon this issue, it 
serves to illustrate one further difficulty with the belief that the 
bottom line limitation to Griggs will greatly simplify employers' 
efforts to comply with the obligations of Title VII and the 
courts' resolution of challenges to the legitimacy of those efforts. 
c. Nondiscriminatory selection rate- The Teal case itself 
involved a situation where the court could with relative ease de-
termine the selection rate that constituted nondiscriminatory 
bottom line performance: the black representation among candi-
dates eligible for promotion established the nondiscriminatory 
bottom line promotion rate. Rarely is the matter so simple. Typ-
ically, determining what constitutes nondiscriminatory bottom 
Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 440 F. Supp. 409, 413 (N.D. Ind. 1977), 
aff'd, 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1100 (1981); cf. Capaci v. Katz & 
Besthoff Inc., 711 F.2d 647,657 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1709 (1984). This 
is sound law even in the usual (non-bottom line) cases where the challenged practices are 
a combination of the employer's intent and a system involving many other factors over 
which the employer may have greater or lesser control. The argument for such a rule is 
even stronger in the bottom line context, where the employer's post-charge affirmative 
action selections are matters entirely within the employer's control. 
Actually, Teal itself presented a situation where the timing of the employer's selec-
tions rendered it manifestly inappropriate to consider a bottom line defense at all. All 
promotions in question came not only after the charge was filed, but after the suit was 
filed as well. See 457 U.S. at 444. The situation did not conform to the classic situation 
of concern, for example, where the post-charge/suit selections correct the employer's in-
adequate pre-charge/suit bottom line performance, but the principle is the same. 
73. That discretion has limits. Section 706(e) of Title VII, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(e) (1982), requires that an EEOC charge be filed by, or on behalf of, a person 
claiming to be aggrieved within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act, or within 
300 days after the act where proceedings have first been commenced with a state or local 
agency that can grant or seek relief for the alleged discrimination or institute criminal 
proceedings with respect thereto. Beyond the scope of this article are certain unresolved 
issues respecting the circumstances under which an individual may avail himself of the 
longer period in certain jurisdictions. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); 
Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 2151 (1984); Wilson v. Wehadkee Yard Mills, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
847 (M.D. Ala. 1983); McGuire v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 933 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
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line performance involves considerable speculation. 
In EEOC u. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,74 for example, the Third 
Circuit found the employer to have met its bottom line require-
ment because the black male proportion of its male work force 
covered by the policy in question exceeded the black male pro-
portion of the male civilian labor force in the Philadelphia 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).711 In Grey-
hound the policy at issue-a no-beard rule for public contact 
positions which plaintiff contended had a disparate impact on 
blacks76-may simply not have affected enough persons to mate-
rially alter the employer's bottom line performance or the em-
ployer's affirmative action efforts may have compensated for its 
effect. Nevertheless, one has good reason to doubt the validity of 
using a group's overall representation in the civilian labor force 
as an indicator of the group's actual representation in the inter-
ested and qualified labor force for a particular job with a partic-
ular employer. Depending on a number of factors, which include 
the location of a facility within the SMSA and the skills re-
quired for the job, the group may have a much higher represen-
tation in the labor force interested in and qualified for the job 
than it has in the SMSA's civilian labor force as a whole.77 Thus 
Greyhound may well have involved a situation where the bottom 
line performance was not actually nondiscriminatory at all. 
Even where there exists applicant flow information, generally 
considered a more reliable indicator of a nondiscriminatory hir-
ing rate, 78 the bottom line adverse impact may go undetected. 
74. 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980). 
75. Id. at 191-92. 
76. See infra text accompanying notes 104-07 for further discussion of the policy at 
issue in Greyhound. 
77. As Judge Sloviter observed in her dissent in Greyhound: 
Even under the majority's view holding workforce percentage relevant in deter-
mining impact, it would be necessary, at a minimum, to consider whether, in the 
absence of the disputed policy, there might be an even higher percentage of 
black employees. It is more than likely that jobs at Greyhound and at other bus 
companies might have particular attraction to blacks who are still deprived of 
equal employment opportunities in certain other industries or who may still suf-
fer from earlier educational deprivations in their quest for employment in cer-
tain other fields. 
635 F.2d at 197. Indeed, what could be clearer than that if minorities who comprise a 
certain percentage of the overall civilian labor force comprise a substantially smaller per-
centage of the persons qualified for the more skilled positions in the work force, they 
must comprise a substantially higher percentage of the labor force for relatively un-
skilled positions? The alternative is that a large proportion of the minority population is 
unemployed. 
78. United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); Hester v. Southern Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379 (5th Cir. 
1974). See Hazlewood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977). 
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The Court has recognized that awareness of a discriminatory se-
lection practice may discourage applicants from applying, dis-
guising the true discriminatory impact of the practice. 79 
Thus, on the one hand, a selection device may exist that can 
usually be reliably determined to disproportionately disadvan-
tage a certain group. On the other, the employer's bottom line 
performance may often be determined to approximate the 
group's representation in the relevant labor market only on the 
basis of considerable speculation. Regardless of whether one ac-
cepts nondiscriminatory bottom line performance as the essen-
tial concern, one must question the wisdom of allowing a highly 
speculative absence of ultimate harm to the group to insulate 
from attack a device that has a clearly observable impact at an 
intermediate state in the process. 
d. Superior performance on job-related criteria-Finally, al-
though it would seem that the apparently nondiscriminatory 
bottom line selection rate would infrequently result from the 
subject group's superior performance on other elements in the 
selection process,80 this may sometimes happen. If the device on 
which the group performs poorly is not job related, and that on 
which it performs well is job related, the apparently nondiscrim-
inatory bottom line selection rate does not really reflect the 
group's representation in the interested and qualified labor 
force. In such cases, the group should receive a share of the se-
lections commensurate with the relative superiority of its job-
related skills. This corresponds to giving whites (as is often the 
case) an apparently disproportionate share of selections where 
the criteria that disproportionately disqualify minorities are 
shown to be job related. 
2. Shortcomings of dispensing justice on a group basis-
Even if the bottom line approach to Griggs were an efficient 
method of ensuring that members of a group are selected at 
rates representative of the group's presence in the relevant labor 
market, considerations of equity and social policy seriously de-
tract from the value of that assurance-to the group and to soci-
ety. With regard to minorities these considerations all involve 
the speciousness of the premise that, in this context, all persons 
in some matter identified as belonging to a certain minority 
group may fairly or usefully be deemed interchangeable.81 
79. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977). 
80. See infra text accompanying notes 120-21. 
81. Remedial quotas also regard members of minority groups as essentially inter-
changeable. Yet, whatever the appropriateness of such measures, allocating remedial 
benefits generally among a disadvantged group when one cannot identify, without exor-
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The first such consideration concerns simple equity. While the 
Griggs rule has not been limited to situations where the chal-
lenged practice perpetuates past discrimination,82 in most cases 
the reason a selection criterion disproportionately disadvantages 
a racial group is that the group has experienced past discrimina-
tion. The Griggs opinion specifically discussed the inferior edu-
cation received by blacks in racially segregated schools and its 
causal connection with the black/white differences in test scores 
and high school completion rates. 83 So situations where the prac-
tice at issue perpetuates past discrimination present the most 
compelling case for applying the Griggs rule. Yet, the applica-
tion of the bottom line limitation to Griggs will in most cases 
deny protection to the persons who have most suffered from 
past discrimination, while favoring those persons who have least 
suffered from past discrimination. 
The second consideration is a practical one and the one that 
most challenges the notion that indiscriminate treatment of a 
group can fairly or adequately address the problems of its mem-
bers. It is exceedingly simple: if blacks who do not score well on 
tests and who have limited educational backgrounds are denied 
those jobs for which high test scores and substantial educational 
backgrounds are unnecessary, what jobs will remain for them? 
Whatever the implications of the underrepresentation of blacks 
among the middle and upper levels of the employment spec-
trum, the nation's most serious problem of racial equality lies in 
bitant expense, the actual victims of the discrimination that the quota seeks to remedy 
differs from permitting discrimination against identified persons because other members 
of their group benefit. Moreover, quota remedies have no inherent tendency to distin-
guish among members of minority groups in the ways found objectionable in the discus-
sion in the succeeding text. 
82. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), where the Court applied Griggs to 
height and weight requirements that obviously had nothing to do with past discrimina-
tion. Cf. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1974), and Gregory v. 
Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1971), where the courts rejected contentions 
that Griggs only applied to situations where the rule in question perpetuated the em-
ployer's past discrimination. (Although the courts did not discuss the matter, one could 
readily find that the policies in question-discharge for garnishment in Wallace; disqual-
ification for arrest record in Gregory-related to societal discrimination.) But see Yuhas 
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 
(1978), where, while accepting that Griggs applied to a no-spouse rule at a facility with 
an overwhelmingly male work force, the court applied a very relaxed standard of job-
relatedness "because [the rule] does not penalize women on the basis of their environ-
mental or genetic background .... " The restrictive interpretation of Griggs in Yuhas 
may, however, represent an aberration that is peculiar to no-spouse rules. Unlike tests 
and most other policies that may disqualify an individual with many employers, and 
hence materially detract from his opportunities throughout the labor market, a no-
spouse rule merely prevents a person from working for one employer. 
83. 431 U.S. at 401. 
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the high unemployment rates among the least educated and 
marginally skilled black labor force. 84 A policy that can only ex-
acerbate the exclusion of a subgroup of the black population 
from the economic mainstream is neither good for the group nor 
good for society. 
Implicit in these considerations rests an additional troubling 
aspect of the bottom line approach to Griggs. In an amicus cu-
riae brief filed in opposition to the bottom line theory, the Law-
yer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law observed that al-
lowing employers to escape liability on the basis of their bottom 
line performance is like permitting employers to favor lighter-
skinned blacks over darker-skinned blacks. 85 Supporters of the 
bottom line theory in Teal would argue against the aptness of 
this analogy because the bottom line theory applies only to un-
intentional discrimination. Whatever the merit of that distinc-
tion as a legal matter, as a policy matter one must consider the 
implications of the fact that there exists ample reason to believe 
the effect of the bottom line limitation of Griggs would be pre-
cisely to favor lighter-skinned blacks over darker-skinned blacks. 
Issues of nature or nurture and cause or effect aside, I.Q. and 
educational attainment correlate highly with socioeconomic sta-
tus;86 among black Americans socioeconomic status has histori-
cally been markedly related to skin color.87 In addition, darker-
skinned blacks are disproportionately concentrated in, or they or 
their families have more recently immigrated from, the South,88 
84. See generally D. GLASGOW, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS (1980). 
85. Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 5. 
86. PROFILE OF AMERICAN YOUTH: 1980 NATIONWIDE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMED 
SERVICES VOCATIONAL APTITUDE BATTERY 40-42 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PROFILE OF 
AMERICAN YOUTH]; L. TYLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN DIFFERENCES 138-51 (3d ed. 
1965); W. SEWELL & R. HAUSER, EDUCATION, OCCUPATION, AND EARNINGS (1975). 
87. J. FLYNN, RACE, IQ AND JENSEN 76 (1980); M. HERSKOVITS, THE AMERICAN NEGRO: 
A STUDY IN RACIAL CROSSING 56-62 (1964 ed.); S. KRoNus, THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 3-4 
(1971); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOC-
RACY 695-700 (1962 ed.); T. SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA 206 (1981). 
Even in the late 1960's a study, which categorized blacks into "dark," "medium," and 
"light," found, for example, that twice the percentage of "light" blacks as "dark" blacks 
had attended college; almost twice the percentage of "light" blacks were in white collar 
occupations; four times the percentage of "light" blacks had a father who attended col-
lege. (The fifteen cities in the study were mostly Northern: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Milwaukee, Newark, New York (Brooklyn only), 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.); Edwards, 
Skin Color as a Variable in Racial Attitudes of Black Urbanites, 3 J. BLACK STUD. 473, 
475-76 (1973). But see Udry, Bauman & Chase, Skin Color, Status, and Mate Selection, 
76 AM. J. Soc. 722 (1971), for indications of recent changes-in the relationship of skin 
color to social mobility. 
88. See E. REUTER, THE MULATTO IN THE UNITED STATES 114-25 (1916); Bodmer, Race 
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where intelligence test scores are lower for all races89 (and espe-
cially for blacks90). Thus, the bottom line approach to Griggs 
will have the tendency-to an indeterminate, though not negligi-
ble, degree-to favor lighter-skinned over darker-skinned 
blacks.91 
and I.Q.: The Genetic Background, in RACE AND INTELLIGENCE 110-11 (1972); Sowell, 
Three Black Histories, in ESSAYS AND DATA ON AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 7, 11 (T. Sow-
ell ed. 1978). The study described in Edwards, supra note 87, found 65% of "dark" 
blacks to be Southern born compared with 52% of the "light" blacks. 
89. See PROFILE OF AMERICAN YOUTH, supra note 86, at 42-43; Bodmer, supra note 88, 
at 110-11. 
90. See Bodmer, supra note 88, at 111. 
91. While it has been recognized that these factors, along with the partly related fac-
tor of assortive mating, see infra note 102, should tend to give lighter-skinned blacks an 
advantage in intelligence testing, see, e.g., L. TYLER, supra note 86, at 118; J. FLYNN, 
supra note 87, at 84; Bodmer, supra note 88, at 110-11; Witty & Jenkins, Intra-race 
Testing and Negro Intelligence, 1 J. PSYCH. (second halO 179, 181, 183 (1936), empirical 
data on the tendency are subject to interpretation. There have been a number of efforts 
to examine possible relationships between the proportion of white ancestry and intellec-
tual skills in the context of the controversy over the cause (heredity or environment) of 
the differences in average I.Q. scores of black and white Americans. (Long before intelli-
gence testing became so prominent an issue, it had been asserted that the greater rela-
tive success of lighter-skinned blacks was related to the supposed genetic superiority of 
the white races. See E. REUTER, supra note 88.) Witty & Jenkins, supra, review the ear-
lier studies of racial admixture and intelligence as measured by standardized tests. The 
authors point out that the studies showing an apparent relationship between proportion 
of white ancestry and intelligence test scores could have been affected by a number of 
factors including higher socioeconomic status of lighter-skinned blacks. Id. at 187, 190-
91. The authors also describe their own study of high 1.Q. black children in Chicago, 
which (even though it did not take socioeconomic status into account) they concluded 
failed to show a relationship between proportion of white ancestry and 1.Q. Id. at 188-89. 
J. FLYNN, supra note 87, has reviewed Witty and Jenkins along with more recent stud-
ies. In this very balanced examination of the most important work on the I.Q. contro-
versy, the author points out that almost all scholars agree that racial admixture studies 
prior to 1965 have little value, id. at 76; and he finds little promise in the more recent 
ones. Id. at 79. He finds an exception, however, in the study by Witty and Jenkins. Id. at 
79-84. If the Witty and Jenkins study conclusively establishes the absence of any rela-
tionship between proportion of white ancestry and 1.Q., including any relationship that 
could be attributed to socioeconomic status, the point made in the text is invalid. 
That study, however, seems to have at least two major difficulties. First, it involved 
only 66 high 1.Q. children, a rather restricted sample on which to base any conclusions so 
contrary to observable social phenomena. Second, Witty and Jenkins' study compared 
the racial admixture of high 1.Q. black children from Chicago with a nationwide estimate 
of the proportion of white ancestry among American blacks found in M.J. HERSKOVITS, 
THE ANTHOPOMETRY OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 15 (1930), which estimate appears to be 
around 29% (my calculations based on 0% white ancestry for Herskovits's all black 
group, 20% for more black than white, 50% for equal black and white, and 70% for 
mostly white). If the proportion of white ancestry among blacks in Chicago was apprecia-
bly lower than 29% (for example, the 13% estimate for Chicago in Bowman, Frischer, 
Ajmar, Carson, & Gower, Population, Family and Biochemical Investigation of Human 
Adenylate Kinase Polymorphism, 214 NATURE 1156 (1967)), an estimate that is consis-
tent with the patterns of black migration to Chicago from Southern states where white 
admixture in the black population was very low, see M. HERSKOVITS, supra, at 8; REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 116 (1967); E. REUTER, 
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Moreover, both of these considerably overlapping factors, as 
well as their connection with the tendency of lighter-skinned 
blacks to outperform darker-skinned blacks on standardized 
tests and in other areas of intellectual achievement, relate, in 
one manner or another, to differences in the degree of past dis-
crimination experienced by the groups. Lighter-skinned blacks 
are to a disproportionate extent descendants of "free persons of 
color" -those blacks who either never became slaves during the 
period when the vague indentured servant status of blacks in 
early colonial times evolved to that of slavery as we commonly 
understand it,92 or who, having been enslaved, were freed prior 
supra note 88, at 124), the evidence developed by Witty and Jenkins would more likely 
show a substantial correlation betweeen I.Q. and skin color (although, to be sure, based 
on a very small sample). This would support the thesis in the text: that the differences in 
socioeconomic status that relate to skin color naturally result in differences in intelli-
gence test scores that relate to skin color. 
One study has sought to examine the relationship of white ancestry and intellectual 
skill while taking into account skin color (to the extent that it varies from proportion of 
black ancestry) and socioeconomic status. See Scarr, Pakstis, Katz, & Barber, Absence of 
a Relationship between Degree of White Ancestry and Intellectual Skills within a 
Black Population, 39 HUM. GENETICS 69 (1977), reprinted in S. ScARR, RACE, SOCIAL 
CLASS, AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN I.Q. 161 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SCARR]. J. 
FLYNN, supra note 87, at 78-79, 264, finds the study inconclusive because of methodologi-
cal problems. In any event, it focuses on the separate issue of whether intellectual skills 
relate to degree of white ancestry because of genetic factors, as distinguished from socio-
economic status. The reader may nevertheless wish to appraise the view expressed in this 
article that, irrespective of the genetic issue, it is to be expected that test scores and 
levels of education of American blacks will be related to skin color and degree of white 
ancestry in light of the Scarr study, as well as Arthur Jensen's comments on it. See 
Jensen, Obstacles, Problems and Pitfalls in Differential Psychology, in SCARR, supra, at 
483, 511-14; Sandra Scarr's reply in SCARR, supra, at 519-22; and Flynn's appraisal of the 
study, J. FLYNN, supra note 87, at 78-79, and of the subsequent Jensen-Scarr debate, id. 
at 262-64. On the issue of whether lighter-skinned blacks may perform better on intelli-
gence tests because of genetic differences between the races and how it bears on the I.Q. 
controversy, it would seem that the difficulties of taking into account socioeconomic sta-
tus and the genetic elements of assortive mating, see infra note 102, as well as the nu-
merous possibilities respecting the genetic make-up of the white ancestors, see 
Centerwall, Comment: The Use of Racial Admixture as Evidence in Intelligence Re-
search: A Critique, 45 HUM. GENETICS 237 (1978), reprinted in SCARR, supra, at 179; 
Scarr, Pakstis, Katz, & Barber, Reply to Centerwall, 47 HuM. GENETICS 225 (1979), re-
printed in SCARR, supra, at 181; J. FLYNN, supra note 87, at 81-83; H.L. MENCKEN, The 
Sahara of the Bozart, in PREJUDICES 69, 78-79 (J.T. Farrell ed. 1955), are too insur-
mountable for racial admixture studies to be of much value. In any case, nothing so far 
developed as persuasively counters the argument that the greater relative achievement of 
lighter-skinned blacks relates to a genetic difference between the races as the greater 
relative success of blacks of West Indian heritage, a group that has a smaller proportion 
of white ancestry than American blacks generally. See Sowell, supra note 88, at 44; cf. 
Traub, You Can Get it if You Really Want, HARPERS, June 1982, at 27. 
92. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the enslavement of blacks in colo-
nial America, see A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978). 
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to the Civil War.03 It has been observed that descendants of 
these disproportionately urban and Northern groups,94 many of 
whose members were given assistance in starting out as free by a 
white parent,95 had a head start of generations over other blacks 
in the process of acculturation to urban industrialized America.96 
Much of what can be said of "free persons of color" can also be 
said of the disproportionately lighter-skinned blacks who occu-
pied a quasi-free status, essentially hiring out their labor often 
as skilled workers in urban areas.97 Even among blacks who were 
not free prior to the Civil War, there was a relationship between 
lightness of skin and the opportunity to acquire the skills and 
the knowledge of white culture necessary for blacks to succeed 
outside the plantation environment. 98 The relationship between 
these factors and past discrimination is evident. 
In the more recent past, while it cannot be denied that 
throughout the United States all persons socially classified as 
black have been treated qualitatively differently from persons 
classified as white, 99 lighter-skinned blacks have usually been 
treated more favorably than darker-skinned blacks100 and 
Northern (hence, lighter-skinned) blacks have been treated more 
favorably than Southern (hence, darker-skinned) blacks, partic-
ularly regarding education. Even today-though the matter is 
occasionally debated101-some employers, particularly if they re-
gard compliance with the law primarily or solely in terms of se-
lecting a number of persons somehow identified as members of a 
particular race, may consciously or unconsciously tend to find 
those numbers of blacks among lighter-skinned persons. Yet, 
even apart from the considerations of how past discrimination 
may be involved in the reasons that lighter-skinned blacks prob-
ably perform better on intelligence tests than darker-skinned 
blacks, 102 the undesirability of the tendency of the bottom line 
93. See Sowell, supra note 88, at 8-9, 14-15; G. MYRDAL, supra note 87, at 696-97. 
94. See Sowell, supra note 88, at 10-11, 16; E. REUTER, supra, note 88, at 114-25. 
95. See Sowell, supra note 88, at 13-14; Edwards, supra note 87, at 477. 
96. See Sowell, supra note 88, at 11-23; T. SOWELL, supra note 87, at 212; G. MYRDAL, 
supra note 87, at 696-97. 
97. See Sowell, supra note 88, at 8-9. 
98. See S. KRONUS, supra note 87, at 3-4; G. MYRDAL, supra note 87, at 696. 
99. See G. MYRDAL, supra note 87, at 698. 
100. See id. at 697; Edwards, supra note 87, at 477. 
101. See Allen, It Ain't Easy Being Pinky, in In the Matter of Color, ESSENCE, July 
1982, at 67, 68. 
102. One possible reason for the correlation between the socioeconomic status of 
American blacks and skin color that is (arguably) not related to discrimination is assor-
tive mating between high achieving black men and lighter-skinned black women. See J. 
FLYNN, supra note 87, at 76; G. MYRDAL, supra note 87, at 697-98; M. HERSKOVITS, supra 
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theory to cause one group to be favored over the other103 ap-
pears self-evident. 
Interestingly, the most notable pro-bottom line court of ap-
peals decision, that on which the Teal dissent most relied, 104 in-
volved an issue that, while having nothing to do with past dis-
crimination, probably had much to do with skin color and 
proportion of black ancestry. In EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 
Jnc.,105 the Third Circuit applied the bottom line theory to reject 
a challenge to a policy of prohibiting the wearing of beards by 
employees in public contact positions. The EEOC had argued 
that the policy was unlawful under Griggs because blacks are 
frequently subject to a condition called pseudofolliculitis barbae 
(PFB) that in some cases makes shaving so painful as virtually 
to require the wearing of a beard. The condition, however, rarely 
seriously affects whites. The court upheld the policy without in-
quiry into its job-relatedness because the defendant employed 
blacks at a rate in excess of their representation in the local la-
bor force. 106 It is difficult to estimate the consequences of the 
application of the bottom line rule to no-beard policies even 
with respect to the affected individuals, because such policies 
will occur with much less frequency than policies involving tests 
and educational credentials. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
one's susceptibility to PFB may likely relate directly to the pro-
portion of one's ancestors who are black. Hence, it is but another 
reason, if only a minor one, to expect the permanent underclass 
that the bottom line limitation to Griggs would help to make 
note 87, at 62-63; S. DRAKE & H.R. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS 506 (1975). This factor 
may have genetic as well as environmental implications, although such implications are 
functions of within-group, not between-group, genetic advantage. 
103. Of course, there does not really exist a well-defined lighter-skinned black middle 
class and darker-skinned black working/lower class. There exists a continuum of socio-
economic strata within which it is difficult to draw well-defined boundaries. Also, the 
correlation of a particular individual's skin color and his socioeconomic status, however 
denominated, will vary from person to person. Cf. G. MYRDAL, supra note 87, at 700. 
These considerations do not seem, however, to importantly mitigate the color-related 
impact of the bottom line aproach to Griggs nor the objectionable implications of that 
impact. Rather, these considerations merely counter any suggestion that the bottom line 
theory will have no such impact because there is no competition betwen lighter- and 
darker-skinned blacks for the same types of jobs. 
104. 457 U.S. at 460. 
105. 635 F.2d 188 (1980). 
106. Although the Teal dissent treated Greyhound as a bottom line case, see 457 U.S. 
at 460 n.5, it could be argued that it was not really a bottom line case because the plain-
tiff failed to prove that, even apart from bottom line considerations, the policy had a 
disparate impact on blacks. See the discussion of Greyhound in EEOC v. Trailways, Inc. 
530 F. Supp. 54, 57 (D. Colo. 1981). It would appear, however, that the bottom line 
limitation on Griggs was at least an alternative basis for the decision. 
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possible, to a disproportionate degree, to be comprised not sim-
ply of black people, but darker-skinned black people. 107 
The foregoing discussion in this subsection pertained essen-
tially to blacks. The failing of the bottom line theory's assump-
tion of fungibility of members of the group manifests itself just 
as succinctly among Hispanics (even when the Hispanic group 
represents only one national origin). Among Hispanics there is 
little doubt that the bottom line approach to Griggs would per-
mit persons to be disadvantaged by certain selection practices 
precisely in proportion to (it might be termed) how Hispanic 
they happen to be. That English is the second language of many 
Hispanics plays a large role in their lower (than Anglo) average 
test scores.108 The bottom line approach would allow non-job-
related tests to disproportionately disqualify persons closer to 
their Hispanic heritage, while more Anglicized Hispanics receive 
special treatment. 109 
In the case of women, application of the bottom line approach 
does not have the same undesirable social implications as in the 
case of minorities (although shorter women might think other-
wise). But another factor renders the application of the bottom 
line theory to issues of sex discrimination the most inappropri-
ate of all. The bottom line approach may serve certain socially 
useful purposes in the case of minority groups that it does not 
serve in the case of women. Members of minority groups are so-
cially and familially related in ways whereby the economic cir-
cumstances of each person are more affected by the economic 
circumstances of other members of the group than by those of 
persons outside the group. Hence, discrimination, by concentrat-
ing unemployment and low-paying jobs within a minority group, 
makes the poverty associated with those conditions more serious 
than if those conditions were equally distributed among all 
groups. Not only is the deprivation of each low-paid or unem-
107. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of color as well as race. E.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). While Congress gave little indication of what it meant 
beyond race discrimination by including the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
color, it is clear enough that an employer's favoring of lighter-skinned blacks over 
darker-skinned blacks would be found unlawful as color, or color and race, discrimina-
tion. Where a neutral practice achieves that effect, there is no reason Griggs should not 
apply. The nondiscriminatory bottom line would not enter into the matter at all, because 
a nondiscriminatory bottom line is not being met for the disadvantaged subgroup. While 
such a theory is sound, because there are enough considerations militating against the 
bottom line approach already treated in the text, it is unnecessary to pursue it here. 
108. See A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING 604-05 (1980). 
109. Consider also the probability that a person designated as an Hispanic who has 
one Hispanic parent will more likely have English as his first language than a person who 
has two Hispanic parents. 
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ployed individual exacerbated because those persons whose eco-
nomic circumstances touch him in some way, being from the 
same group, tend to ·be similarly disadvantaged, but there also 
tends to be a general demoralization of the minority community. 
Although the bottom line approach to Griggs subordinates in-
dividual fairness to convenience, nondiscrimination laws con-
tinue to serve socially useful purposes. The employers' accept-
able bottom line performance abates the concentration of 
economic disadvantage within an economically interrelated (mi-
nority) group. This ultimately benefits even those members of 
the group who are disadvantaged by the discriminatory prac-
tices. Still, because, as discussed above, the bottom line limita-
tion, as a practical matter, achieves these purposes in an exceed-
ingly unsatisfactory manner, these theoretical benefits remain 
insufficient to justify the rule. 
For women, the bottom line theory lacks even a theoretical 
foundation. Women do not comprise a group in which the mem-
bers are more affected by the economic circumstances of other 
members of the group than by those of persons outside the 
group; in fact, women engage in considerably greater sharing of 
economic circumstances with men than with other women. 
Hence, the poverty associated with unemployment and low-pay-
ing jobs is not more severe when those conditions are concen-
trated among women than when they are borne equally by both 
sexes. So when under the bottom line approach to Griggs indi-
vidual women are disadvantaged because of sex-related charac-
teristics, the selection of other women in their places serves no 
socially useful purpose whatever. Unlike minorities, women dis-
advantaged by the discriminatory practices do not even receive a 
remote economic benefit from the fact that other members of 
their group are selected in their places. Whatever may be said 
for the advantages of treating minorities as groups, nothing can 
be said for treating women as a group; women can only be 
treated fairly as individuals. 110 
III. THE WEIGHTED FACTOR ISSUE 
The Teal dissent observed that under the majority's reasoning 
nondiscriminatory bottom line performance would preclude a 
110. For a more extensive discussion of the differences in the nature of racial and 
gender groups and how they should affect approaches to equal employment opportunity, 
see Scanlan, Employment Quotas for Women?, PuB. INTEREST., Fall 1983, at 106. 
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challenge to a test that had a disparate impact where the test 
comprised merely one weighted factor considered along with 
other factors in a multi-component selection process.m The dis-
sent apparently based that view on the majority's emphasis on 
the word "opportunity" in its prima facie analysis.112 As stated 
above, 113 the majority found the disparate impact upon the 
group in the pass-fail test's disproportionate reduction of the 
pool of black candidates who would· have the opportunity to 
compete further. The dissent seems to have interpreted this rea-
soning to mean that a single weighted factor in a multi-compo-
nent selection process would not have a disparate impact upon 
the group because it would not disproportionately reduce the 
number of persons who would have the opportunity to compete 
further; hence, if the selection process as a whole produces no 
disparate impact, a plaintiff could not challenge the single 
weighted factor despite race-related performance differences on 
the factor. 
It would seem, however, that whatever merit the dissent's in-
terpretations of the majority's subtle focusing on the group im-
pact at the time the pass-fail test restricted the eligible pool has, 
it overlooks the majority's very explicit statement of what the 
statute requires. In concluding its analysis of whether the plain-
tiff established a prima facie case, the majority stated: "The 
suggestion that disparate impact should be measured only at the 
bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these indi-
vidual respondents the opportunity to compete equally with 
white workers on the basis of job-related criteria."m That guar-
antee is no less abrogated when the non-job-related criterion on 
which a minority or woman must compete is a single weighted 
factor in the selection process than when it is a pass-fail barrier. 
When the Second Circuit originally drew the distinction be-
tween the pass-fail device before it and a single weighted factor, 
it was responding to arguments based on Judge Newman's deci-
sion in Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board. 115 In Brown 
the court rejected a challenge to a written examination that had 
a substantial disparate impact on blacks on the grounds that 
there was no significant disparate impact in overall hiring rates. 
In that decision Judge Newman raised the specter of individual 
challenges to "subtests, sub-subtests and even individual ques-
111. 457 U.S. at 463 n.8. 
112. Id. at 445-51. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
114. 457 U.S. at 451 (emphasis in original). 
115. 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979). 
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tions within test segments," should substantially equal overall 
selection rates not provide a defense. 116 
Examining this specter, the Second Circuit observed that a 
burdensome evaluation of sub-tests need only take place when a 
nondisparate, cumulative, overall score subsumed a disparate 
subscore. 117 The court noted that in such a case some internal 
mechanism, probably affirmative action, would have to offset the 
disparate impact caused by the discriminatory component. Be-
cause "all of the candidates in such a process would have been 
afforded the opportunity to receive the benefit of the offsetting 
mechanism, however, [ the court reasoned that] the overall re-
sults of the process should be deemed a fair barometer of the 
fairness of the process. "118 
In an amicus curiae brief filed by the Department of Justice 
in Teal in the Supreme Court (arguing in favor of the bottom 
line approach) the Government disparaged the Second Circuit's 
efforts to distinguish the two situations. It pointed out that 
under the Second Circuit's analysis, if the employer simply al-
lowed all persons who did poorly on an exam that had a dispa-
rate impact to compete further in the process, it would remain 
free to consider the results of the exam and on the basis of those 
results to select the same individuals it would choose if it had 
used the exam as a pass-fail barrier. In many cases it could still 
be shown that the same persons who would have been elimi-
nated by the test if it were a pass-fail barrier would effectively 
be denied any real chance of selection when the test is used as a 
single weighted factor. The result, the Government concluded, is 
the same. 119 
The Government's attack on the Second Circuit's analysis has 
considerable merit. As a practical matter a single weighted fac-
tor can play at least as determinative a role in the process as a 
pass-fail barrier. As the Second Circuit suggested, in the great 
majority of cases the nondiscriminatory bottom line selection 
rate will result from affirmative action, not from the subject 
group's superior performance on other components in the proc-
ess.120 In such cases, it is reasonable to expect a person's chance 
116. Id. at 1262. 
117. 645 F.2d at 139. 
118. Id. (emphasis in original). 
119. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-16. 
120. Because it is difficult to conceive of situations where the groups disadvantaged 
by selection devices commonly used by employers outperform other groups on other ele-
ments in the selection processes, it is reasonable to assume that such cases will infre-
quently arise. 
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of selection will precisely inversely relate to how much the dis-
criminatory device disadvantaged him. An employer that uses a 
discriminatory selection device presumably does so because it 
believes the device has some value in predicting job perform-
ance; therefore it will probably follow the rankings influenced or 
controlled by that device in making its affirmative action selec-
tions. Thus, the low scorer's continued eligibility to benefit from 
the employer's affirmative action will not amount to the "oppor-
tunity to compete equally with white workers on the basis of 
job-related criteria" envisioned by the Teal majority,121 and, in 
fact, it may provide no opportunity whatever. 
Even in the infrequent cases where the subject group's supe-
rior performance on other components of the selection process 
achieves the nondiscriminatory bottom line result, there is no 
reason to expect that the superior performance will materially 
alter the within-group rankings. Here too, then, the discrimina-
tory selection device may essentially dictate the employment de-
cision. In fact, a weighted factor in a multi-component selection 
process will usually play a more significant role in determining 
job selections than a pass-fail device that plays no other role in 
the selection process beyond restricting the eligible pool. 122 In 
the pass-fail case, the discr1minatory device disadvantages only 
those who fail. In the weighted factor case, all members of the 
disadvantaged group continue to have their chance of selection 
affected by a device that has a race-related impact. Thus, 
whether affirmative action or the group's superior performance 
on other elements in the selection process achieves the nondis-
criminatory bottom line selection rate, no member of the group 
actually enjoys the "opportunity to compete equally with white 
121. 457 U.S. at 451 (emphasis omitted). 
122. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures have recognized 
that the tests frequently have a greater adverse impact when used for ranking than when 
used as pass-fail devices, and they require greater evidence of validity when this greater 
impact occurs. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(G) (1984); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 100-05 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981), where the 
court discussed the fact that a device is much less likely to predict relative abilities to 
perform a job than it is to determine who may perform the job at all. Cf. Firefighters 
Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 357 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981). These considerations are relevant here in two respects. 
First, as noted in the text, using a device that has an adverse impact as a weighted factor 
will cause it to disadvantage more persons in their competition with whites on the basis 
of race-related factors. Second, the assumption that tests and other devices that may not 
withstand an actual test of validity nevertheless have a certain usefulness in predicting 
job performance no doubt colors the approach of many to the bottom line issue and to 
testing issues generally; this assumption has an even weaker foundation where the em-
ployer uses the device for ranking. 
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workers on the basis of job-related criteria." 
Many who would generally distinguish the single weighted fac-
tor context from the pass-fail context in applying the bottom 
line defense would probably concede that at some point a 
weighted factor assumes so determinative a role in the selection 
process that courts should treat it like a pass-fail barrier.123 Yet, 
even evaluating the role of the discriminatory weighted factor 
presents problems. The evaluation cannot be based simply on 
the weight which the rating system used in the selection process 
purports to accord the factor. Even where the the employer gives 
the results of a particular component relatively little weight, if 
candidates' performance on the other components tend to equal-
ize, the results on the discriminatory component may be deter-
minative most of the time.124 Hence, appraisal of the significance 
of the component must turn on the correlation of rankings on 
that component with the likelihood of selection. This does not 
present a simple inquiry either for a court or for an employer 
that desires to order its practices to comply with the law. More-
over, ultimately the law's decision as to the level of correlation 
below which it would distinguish a weighted factor from a pass-
fail barrier could only be arbitrary. In any event, in almost all 
123. The one reported post-Teal case to consider Teal's implications with respect to 
devices that do not constitute absolute pass-fail barriers held, with little analysis, that 
Teal required that the impact of a written test in a promotion process must be evaluated 
separately because "it could have had a major impact on an individual's opportunity to 
be favorably considered for promotion." Williams v. City of San Francisco, 31 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 887 (N.D. Cal. 1983). It should be noted, however, that the court 
reached this conclusion in the context of an unwarranted holding that the individual 
elements of the selection process (a written test and an interview) could only be evalu-
ated for disparate impact separately. The court had apparently ruled earlier that it 
would determine disparate impact on the basis of the 80% relative success rate ratio rule 
of Department of Justice Guidelines for Employee Selection, 28 C.F.R. § 50.14(4)(D) 
(1984). The plaintiff then sought to apply the 80% rule to the combined results of both 
elements of the process. (There are circumstances where, under the 80% rule, there 
would be a disparate impact for both elements combined but not for either element eval-
uated separately. Consider, for example, a two-tier process in which 100 whites and 100 
blacks compete: 90 whites and 73 blacks pass the first tier, an 81 % black/white relative 
success rate ratio, and of those who passed the first tier 80 whites and 55 blacks pass the 
second tier, an 85% black/white relative success rate ratio. Although no disparate impact 
exists on either element under the 80% rule, for the two elements combined the black 
success rate is only 69% of the white.) Williams seems an obviously perverse reading of 
Teal. Yet given the superficial appeal of all arguments that "plaintiffs are having it both 
ways," see supra note 18, it would not be surprising to see the same argument pursued 
elsewhere. 
124. For example, a component of an exam may be given only 10 points in a 100-
point selection process. Nevertheless, if the results of the other components tend to 
equalize around 75, while the scores on the single 10-point component range between 2 
and 8, as a practical matter, the single component will almost always dictate the 
selections. 
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cases where the factor has any significance, some score will oper-
ate as the minimum which a candidate must achieve in order to_ 
have any chance of selection; for those who fail to achieve that 
score the device will have acted precisely as a pass-fail barrier. 
When employers use specific neutral criteria other than tests 
as weighted factors, the virtual identity of such factors with 
pass-fail barriers may be most evident. Suppose, for example, 
that an employer does not- absolutely refuse to hire persons 
without high school diplomas or with arrest or conviction 
records, but merely gives these factors a certain weight, let us 
even say, only when all other things are equal. When the em-
ployer selects from a large pool of similarly qualified candidates, 
giving these factors any weight at all can have the same effect as 
using them as absolute bars. 125 Thus, whether one deems a de-
vice with a disparate impact a pass-fail barrier or merely a single 
weighted factor, the only way to guarantee that it does not im-
properly deny individuals opportunities on the basis of race-re-
lated characteristics is to prohibit entirely its consideration un-
less the employer can show its job-relatedness. There exists no 
analytically plausible basis for a different rule where the selec-
tion process as a whole yields a nondiscriminatory bottom line 
result. 
Judge Newman, in Brown v. New Haven Civil Service 
Board, 126 raises the main countervailing consideration. He main-
tains that courts will have to sort out and evaluate the minute 
components of a theoretically infinitely fragmeritable selection 
process if they cannot apply a bottom line limitation. This con-
cern has little legitimate basis. As the Second Circuit pointed 
out, 127 in the great majority of cases affirmative action, not supe-· 
rior performance by the subject group on other elements in the 
process, will achieve the nondiscriminatory bottom line result.128 
125. In Green v. Missouri P. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1296-99 (8th Cir. 1975), the 
court examined whether an employer could use conviction records as absolute bars to 
selection and enjoined the practice. In context, the ruling that the employer merely could 
not use conviction records as absolute bars would seem appropriate. The court intended 
to permit the employer to consider those records on an individual basis and, where war-
ranted by considerations such as the nature of the conviction and the type of job, to 
allow the employer to base employment decisions on those records. A rule, however, al-
lowing an employer, without business justification, to consider that one of two candidates 
for a position had a conviction record as a reason to select the other would conflict with 
Griggs, if that case is to have any real meaning, even though the employer would not 
consider the conviction an absolute bar. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. 
128. It is even less likely that the nondiscriminatory bottom line selection rates will 
result from factors other than affirmative action in the weighted factor context than in 
738 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:3 
Hence, the inquiry rarely will entail the examination of numer-
ous elements of a fragmented system to determine which ele-
ments favor what group and of the elements favoring each group 
which relate to job performance; rather, the result of the selec-
tion process as a whole, up to the point where the employer im-
poses affirmative action considerations, will show a discrimina-
tory impact.129 · 
Even if there exist cases where courts must examine the im-
pact and job-relatedness of numerous elements, one must weigh 
the burden that this concededly complicated inquiry will impose 
upon the court against the range of deleterious consequences of 
the bottom line theory. These consist not only of all the aspects 
of individual and group unfairness associated with the bottom 
line rule discussed above, 130 but also the burdens imposed on the 
judicial system. These judicial burdens include evaluating the 
actual weight of the element in the selection process, 131 . deter-
mining whether an acceptable bottom line was reached, and per-
forming these analyses not once and for all, but each time a per-
son disadvantaged by the element chooses to challenge it. 
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the situations where 
the court must inquire into the impact and job-relatedness of 
numerous elements in a selection process also constitute those 
situations where the group's superior performance on other ele-
ments in the process achieves the nondiscriminatory bottom 
line. As discussed above, 132 if those elements on which the sub-
ject group's performance exceeds that of other groups relate to 
job skills while the challenged element does not, the assertedly 
nondiscriminatory bottom line result really does not reflect non-
discrimination at all. Too often do job-related selection criteria 
the pass-fail context. In the latter situation, there is at least the possibility that, while 
excluding a disproportionate number of members of a certain group from further consid-
eration, it will not affect the overall selection rates, since all groups perform equally on 
other factors and no person who would otherwise be selected is eliminated because of the 
device; that is, the racial composition of the top-ranked candidates may be unaffected by 
the device. But in the case of the weighted factor, as the Second Circuit observed, "it is 
difficult to conceive of how the dry scores of a multi-component selection could discrimi-
nate in part, but not in the aggregate, without the influence of some affirmative action 
effort designed to achieve the non-discriminatory overall result." 645 F.2d at 139. 
129. Of course, cases may arise where courts find it difficult to determine whether the 
nondiscriminatory bottom line selection rates resulted from affirmative action. In such 
cases, however, it is reasonable to assume that affirmative action produced the result, at 
least where there exists no reason to believe otherwise. In cases where the selection proc-
ess produces rankings of candidates, there will be no question at all. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 81-110. 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24. 
132. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
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disadvantage minorities for courts to exalt the cause of conven-
ience in order to deny them a greater proportion of the opportu-
nities when job-related criteria favor them. 
CONCLUSION 
In Connecticut v. Teal, the Supreme Court wisely rejected a 
limitation to the rule of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that would 
permit employers to use non-job-related selection criteria where 
the success rate for black candidates equals or exceeds that for 
white candidates notwithstanding the operation of a pass-fail 
exam that disproportionately disqualifies black candidates from 
further consideration. The Court, however, failed to address 
many of the reasons supporting the result; these reasons include 
not only considerations of fairness to individuals and groups 
protected by Title VII, but also considerations which suggest the 
illusory nature of the primary rationale for the limita-
tion-convenience. Although the Teal majority did not purport 
to address the bottom line issue where the element in the selec-
tion process comprises merely a weighted factor in a multi-com-
ponent selection process, significant language in the opinion of-
fers strong support for rejection of the bottom line theory in 
such a context. Whether the opinion can or cannot be so read, 
no legitimate basis exists under the bottom line theory for treat-
ing such an element differently from a pass-fail barrier. For the 
same reasons that the Court properly rejected the bottom line 
theory in the pass-fail context of the Teal case, the theory 
should also be rejected where the element in question comprises 
only a weighted factor in a multi-component selection process. 

